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PRE-IMPLANTATION FERTILITY CONTROL AND
THE ABORTION LAWS
SYBIL MELOY*
SCIENTISTS THROUGHOUT the United States and other areas of the
world are presently engaged in research with the purpose of
finding ideal methods of fertility control. These methods must be
effective and safe. In addition, where the users are poor or un-
educated, they should be inexpensive and extremely simple to use.
One of the more promising areas of current research is directed
toward fertility control by the termination of pregnancy after con-
ception, but before implantation of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus. This area will be here designated "pre-implantation fer-
tility control." This article is concerned with pre-implantation
fertility control and the problems under the abortion laws that
will affect the legality of its use.
The various state abortion laws are conveniently grouped into
two categories: (1) statutes which do not expressly make preg-
nancy an element of the offense, and (2) statutes which expressly
make pregnancy an element of the offense.
Statutes which do not expressly make pregnancy an element of
the offense generally refer to acts toward "a woman," "any woman,"
or a woman "pregnant or supposed to be pregnant." If pregnancy
is not an express element of the statutory offense, specified acts in-
tended to produce an "abortion" or "miscarriage" generally con-
stitute the prohibited conduct. The problem then is: What is an
"abortion" or "miscarriage"?
Statutes which expressly make pregnancy an element of the
offense generally refer to acts toward a "pregnant" woman, a wom-
an "pregnant with child" or a woman "with child." These
statutes present a greater number of problems, one of which is the
determination of the earliest stage of pregnancy at which the of-
fense can be committed. Specifically, do such statutes apply to
termination of pregnancy before implantation? Some state statutes
define the period of pregnancy during which an abortion can be
* B.S. University of Illinois, 1961; the author is employed in foreign patent prosecu-
tion.
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committed. Other statutes do not. Some statutes refer to destruc-
tion of the "embryo" or the "unborn child." Under these statutes,
what exactly is an embryo or an unborn child? Another problem
is whether the statutes apply to the use of pre-implantation fertility
control devices and drugs on a non-pregnant woman to terminate
future pregnancies.
The difficulties of these problems are compounded by the ab-
sence of reported cases concerning the legality of pre-implantation
fertility control. Cases which have construed the abortion statutes
may not be controlling in cases where the legality of pre-implanta-
tion fertility control is at issue because of the unique nature of the
problem.
This article will, in addition, consider the problem of proof
of a pregnancy terminated prior to implantation, and the hypo-
thetical effect of the Model Penal Code on the legality of the
termination of pregnancy in such a manner.
I. PRE-IMPLANTATION MEANS OF FERTILITY CONTROL
For the purpose of this discussion, drugs, mechanical devices,
and other means which act to terminate pregnancy after conception
but before implantation, will be designated "pre-implantation
means of fertility control" or "pre-implantation means."
"Implantation" is the fixation of a fertilized ovum on the
uterine wall. After ovulation the unfertilized ovum enters the
Fallopian tubes where "fertilization," also called "conception," oc-
curs. Conception marks the beginning of pregnancy.' Under nor-
mal circumstances, the microscopic, fertilized ovum completes the
2/ inch journey through the Fallopian tubes, enters the uterus
and is implanted in the uterine tissue.2 The time between fertiliza-
tion and implantation is estimated to be roughly 7 to 8 days.'
The pre-implantation means of fertility control, as defined
above, act to destroy the fertilized ovum during this journey or to
prevent implantation. If implantation does not occur, the fertilized
1 1 C.J.S., Abortion § 6 (1936); Webster, Third New International Dictionary 1788
(1961); Gould, Medical Dictionary 1136 (5th rev. ed. 1941).
2 See Gray, Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine 693-94 (2d ed. 1940). For a more com-
prehensive treatment, see Arey, Developmental Anatomy 57-89 (6th ed. 1954), and Gray,
Anatomy of the Human Body 25-30 (26th ed. 1956).
3 Ibid.
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ovum is discharged and pregnancy is terminated. It is very impor-
tant to recognize that we are not here concerned with contracep-
tives, i.e. means which prevent fertilization.4 Nor are we here con-
cerned with means that terminate pregnancy after implantation.
We are dealing with a small, but extremely important area, namely
that of fertility control between the time of conception and im-
plantation.
There are no means of fertility control marketed in the
United States which have been proved to prevent implantation.
However, various drugs for this purpose are being studied.5 Mech-
anical devices-theorized, but not proved, to prevent implantation
-are being sold in the United States and used in other countries.6
A unique factor associated with their legality is the ability to use
these devices on a non-pregnant woman to terminate future preg-
nancies.7
II. ABORTION STATUTES
In most jurisdictions, at common law, a criminal abortion
could not be committed upon a woman unless she was pregnant
and had reached the stage of quickening.8 But in a few states
pregnancy to the stage of quickening was not required.9 "Quick-
ening" is that stage of pregnancy where the mother first feels the
4 The term "contraceptives" is often incorrectly used to designate abortifacients.
"Abortifacients" produce an abortion. An abortion can be produced only after conception.
5 Jackson, Antifertility Substances, 11 Pharm. Rev. 135, 154-159 (1959). Drug Trade
News, July 1, 1964, p. 13, col. 3 states:
Possible new vistas ... in the next few years researchers point out, are drugs
which prevent nidation (the implantation of the fertilized egg in the endo-
metrium). One such drug being studied at the Weizman Institute in Israel is
called ergocornine ....
6 Doctors are not yet sure how these devices operate but a current theory is that
they control fertility by preventing implantation of the fertilized ovum. The devices
presently used include: a ring made of stainless-steel spring, a polyethylene spiral, a
double-S loop of plastic, and a double triangle of plastic. The device is inserted by a
physician into the uterus of the woman. See Life, May 10, 1963, p. 37; Time, July 31,
1964, p. 48; 188 J.A.M.A. Medical News, No. 10, p. 40 (1964); Med. World News, Nov. 8,
1963, p. 54.
At the 12th annual meeting of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, (Miami Beach, May, 1964), orders were taken for two of these intrauterine devices.
This indicates that the devices are on the market for physician use.
7 The devices are purposely inserted into the uterus of a non-pregnant woman. 188
J.A.M.A. No. 10, supra note 6.
8 Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass. 387 (1812); see cases cited, Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d
1393, 1396 (1956).
9 Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 630 (1850); See cases cited, Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1393-
(1956).
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movement of the child 0 and occurs in about the fourth or fifth
month of pregnancy. 1
The basis of the majority view requiring quickening was that
at this stage the unborn child had a separate existence and was a
human being. A termination of pregnancy after quickening consti-
tuted the destruction of a human. Since the pre-implantation
means of fertility control act within the first two weeks of preg-
nancy, before quickening, their use would not be a criminal abor-
tion in the common law jurisdictions where pregnancy at the stage
of quickening was required.
In the common law jurisdiction where pregnancy at the stage
of quickening was not required, broad language, going far beyond
the necessities of the case, was often used to indicate that a criminal
abortion could be committed from the moment of conception. The
rationale behind this view is set forth in Mills v. Commonwealth.'2
In that case, the contention was made that failure to charge the
killing of a quick child in the indictment was fatal to the convic-
tion. The court answered the contention saying:
[I]t is a flagrant crime at common law to attempt to procure the
miscarriage or abortion of the woman because it interferes with and
violates the mysteries of nature in that process by which the hu-
man race is propagated and continued. It is a crime against nature
which obstructs the fountain of life .... [It is not necessary that
the woman had become quick.] It is not the murder of a living
child which constitutes the offense, but the destruction of gestation
by wicked means and against nature. The moment the womb is
instinct with embryo life and gestation has begun, the crime may
be perpetrated .... [T]he civil rights of an infant in ventre sa mere
are fully protected at all periods after conception.'3
'This statement was much broader than the necessities of the case
required since the woman was sufficiently advanced in pregnancy
to be "big with child." However, any pre-implantation means
used to interrupt gestation would fall within the broad language
used.
Today, in all American jurisdictions, the crime of abortion
.and related offenses are controlled by statutes, many of which have
10 Ballantine, Law Dictionary 1069 (1948).
11 Gould, Medical Dictionary 1174 (5th rev. ed. 1941).
12 Supra note 9.
13 Id. at 633.
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drastically altered the common law rule. The trend of the statutes
has been to omit the requirement of quickening, and in the more
liberal jurisdictions even the requirement of pregnancy.
1. Statutes Which Do Not Expressly Make Pregnancy an
Element of the Offense
(a) Statutes Referring to "A Woman" or "'Any Woman"
Seventeen states' 4 and the District of Columbia"6 have criminal
abortion statutes referring to acts toward "a woman" or "any wom-
an" with intent to produce an "abortion" or "miscarriage" and
which do not contain any express indication that the woman must
be pregnant. In effect, the act proscribed is the attempt to produce
the abortion. Such statutes can be classified into three types.
One type is the statute which expressly states that the crime
can be committed whether or not the woman is pregnant.16 Cases
construing such liberal enactments, consistent with the literal
terms of the statute, have recognized that pregnancy is not an ele-
ment of the offense defined. 17 The significant element in these
14 a. Cal. Pen. Code § 274.
b. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-29 (1958).
c. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 797.01 (1944).
d. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, § 23-1 (1963).
e. Iowa Code § 701.1 (1962).
f. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 272, § 19 (1956).
g. Minn. Stat. § 617.18 (1963).
h. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.100 (1953).
i. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.120 (1961).
j. N.Y. Pen. Law § 80 (1944).
k. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.16 (Page 1954).
1. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 861 (Supp. 1963).
m. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4718 (1963).
n. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-302 (1955).
o. Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-62 (1960).
p. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.02.010 (1961).
q. W. Va. Code Ann. § 5923 (1961).
Many of the above states have other abortion statutes that are not pertinent here.
15 D.C. Code Ann. § 22-201 (1961).
16 The Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New York, and Washington statutes
cited supra note 14.
17 People v. Kellner, 52 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1945); see cases cited, Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d
1393, 1407 (1956). [State v. Keller, 287 Mo. 124, 229 S.W. 203 (1921), cited in this annota-
tion was said to be seemingly in conflict with holdings in Missouri and other states on this
point. But Keller can be reconciled. Proof of pregnancy was necessary to indicate that an
actual abortion, not merely an attempted abortion, was performed. It was necessary to
indicate that an actual abortion had been performed because a Missouri statute provided
that no person shall be convicted in abortion cases on the basis of a dying declaration
unless there was corroboration that an abortion or miscarriage had taken place. Here the
basis of the conviction was a dying declaration and there was no corroborative evidence
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statutes is the intent to produce a "miscarriage" or "abortion." In
the legal sense, the words "miscarriage" and "abortion" are gener-
ally considered equivalent 8 and interpreted to mean the unlaw-
ful interruption of pregnancy at any time during gestation,' 9 un-
less accompanying words in the statute imply a particular stage of
gestation. Since the pre-implantation means of fertility control are
used with intent to interrupt pregnancy, their use would seem to
violate these statutes which refer to acts toward "a woman" or "any
woman," "whether pregnant or not," with intent to produce a mis-
carriage or abortion.
The second type of statute referring to acts upon "a woman"
or "any woman" is that which does not expressly state that the
crime can be committed whether or not the woman is pregnant,
yet does not imply that a pregnant condition is necessary to the
offense.2" In construing statutes of this type, courts have held that
pregnancy is not an element of the crime.2 ' Again the essence of
the offense is the intent to produce the "miscarriage" or "abor-
tion." This is typically the intent of the person using or admin-
istering the pre-implantation means. There is little doubt, there-
fore, that the use of such means would fall plainly within the pur-
view of these statutes.
The third type of statute referring to acts upon "a woman"
or "any woman" is that which does not expressly state that the
-criminal offense can be committed whether or not the woman is
pregnant, but, on the other hand, contains language which implies
that an abortion or miscarriage had taken place. The Missouri abortion statute was said
to punish the attempt to abort; the evidentiary statute, relating to corroboration of dying
declarations, referred to actual abortions.]
The Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New York, and Washington statutes cited supra
note 14, have a clause referring to the administration of a drug, etc., to "a woman" or
"any woman" whether pregnant or not, followed by a clause referring to the use of an
instrument or other means with intent to produce an abortion. This latter clause is not
.qualified by the phrase "whether pregnant or not" or similar language. Nevertheless, the
courts construing the statute have read the phrase "whether pregnant or not" of the first
.clause into the second clause and not required a showing of pregnancy where instruments
were used. E.g., People v. Williams, 260 App. Div. 1024, 23 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1940) (by implica-
tion), aft'd, 285 N.Y. 728, 34 N.E.2d 895 (1941).
18 Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 630 (1850), and 1 C.J.S., Abortion § 1 (1936).
19 See Gray v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. 221, 178 S.W. 337 (1915); 2 Bouvier's Law Dic-
.tionary 2221 (Rawles, 3rd rev. 1914); 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abortion § 1 (1962).
20 The statutes of California, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
.and Tennessee cited supra note 14 are of this type.
21 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 132 Mass. 261 (1882); Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1404
(1956).
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that a pregnant condition must be terminated or attempted to be
terminated. This implication is made by language excepting acts
done to preserve the life of the woman's "unborn child ' 2 2 or of the
"mother, ' 23 language providing penalties only "if the woman dies
or miscarries" '24 or language referring to acts done with an "intent
to destroy her [the woman's] unborn child. '25 Whether pregnancy
really is an element of the offense necessarily hinges upon the word-
ing of the statute in question.2 ' Nevertheless, even if pregnancy is
required, the use of the phrases referring to an intent to produce
a "miscarriage" or "abortion" has been interpreted to mean that
pregnancy at any stage is sufficient.27 Thus, under this third type of
statute the use of the pre-implantation means on a pregnant
woman would seem to be illegal. !Likewise, the use of the means
on a non-pregnant woman to terminate future pregnancies might
come within the offense set forth, since the methods would be used
on "a woman" or "any woman" and a pregnant condition would
be terminated.
(b) Statutes Referring to a Pregnant Woman or Woman Sup-
posed to be Pregnant
Six states have criminal abortion statutes referring to acts to-
ward a woman "pregnant or supposed to be pregnant" or using
22 The Connecticut statute, supra note 14b.
23 The District of Columbia statute, supra note 15.
24 The Ohio statute, supra note 14k.
25 The Virginia and West Virginia statutes, supra note 14. The pertinent provisions
of both these statutes read "with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abor-
tion or miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child or produce such abortion or mis-
carriage."
26 Pregnancy is probably not an element of the crime in one jurisdiction, e.g. the
District of Columbia. Pecklam v. United States, 226 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 912 (1955), (construing 31 Stat. 1322 similar to the District of Columbia statute,
supra note 15).
Pregnancy may be an element of the crime in the other jurisdictions having this type
of statute. In Ohio the crime is not complete unless the woman either miscarries or dies.
1 Ohio Jur. 2d, Abortion § 7 (1953). Thus, if there is no maternal death, pregnancy and
consequent miscarriage are required to commit the crime.
Logically, in order to "destroy such [unborn] child or produce such abortion or
miscarriage," required by the language of the Virginia and West Virginia statutes, supra
note 14, the woman must be pregnant. Such a construction was implied in Anderson v.
Commonwealth, 190 Va. 655, 58 S.E.2d 72 (1950).
But an intention that pregnancy be an element of the offense might be refuted by the
fact that earlier abortion statutes in some states contained an express requirement of preg-
nancy which the later statutes omitted. See earlier statutes set forth in Quay, Justifiable
Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 Geo. L.J. 395, 447-520 (1961).
27 See Gray v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. 221, 178 S.W. 337 (1915); 2 Bouvier's Law Dic-
tionary 2221 (Rawles, 3rd rev. 1914); 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abortion § 1 (1962); Coffman v.
Commonwealth, 188 Va. 553, 50 S.E.2d 431 (1948) (by implication).
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similar language. 21 Cases arising under such statutes, in accordance
with the express language, have held that actual pregnancy need
not be an element of the offense; the supposition is sufficient.29
However, two of the statutes8" provide penalties only upon
miscarriage by or death of the woman. Proper use of the implan-
tation means should only cause miscarriage, not death. If the
woman does not die, miscarriage is necessary for the penalties to
apply. Pregnancy is necessary for a miscarriage. Thus, as applied to
the pre-implantation means, pregnancy and consequent mis-
carriage are, practically speaking, elements of the offense under
these two statutes.
A question may arise as to whether reference to a woman
"pregnant or supposed to be pregnant" under these statutes means
a woman in any stage of pregnancy. The Kentucky statute ex-
pressly answers the question by referring to a woman pregnant or
supposed to be pregnant "at any time during the period of gesta-
tion.""1 There is no doubt that gestation begins at the moment of
conception.82 But what of the statutes which do not contain an ex-
press definition of pregnancy? The general rule of interpretation
is that the ordinary meaning is intended.8 The ordinary meaning
of "pregnancy" is the condition existing from the moment of con-
ception.84 Therefore, if the pre-implantation means to control fer-
tility were used after conception, after pregnancy had begun, their
use would come within the meaning of these criminal abortion
statutes which refer to a woman "pregnant or supposed to be preg-
nant" or use similar language. But a difficult problem of statutory
construction arises when these means are intentionally used on a
non-pregnant woman to terminate future pregnancies. Are the
statutes violated under these circumstances? Would there be an act
28 a. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 301 (1953).
b. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-105 (1956).
c. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 436.020 (1962).
d. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-3-1 (1956).
e. Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 13, § 101 (1958).
f. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-77 (1957).
29 Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1409 (1956).
80 The Indiana and Wyoming statutes, supra note 28.
81 Supra note 28c.
32 Webster, Third New International Dictionary 952 (1961); Ballantine, Law Dic-
tionary 954 (1948 ed.); Gould, Medical Dictionary 554 (5th rev. ed. 1941).
83 82 C.J.S., Statutes § 316b (1953).
84 1 C.J.S., Abortion § 6 (1936); Webster, Third New International Dictionary 1788
(1961); Gould, Medical Dictionary 1136 (5th rev. ed. 1941).
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toward a woman "pregnant or supposed to be pregnant"? Literally
there would not be.
2. Statutes Which Expressly Make Pregnancy An Element of
the Offense
The criminal abortion statutes which expressly make preg-
nancy an element of the offense present a great number of prob-
lems of construction and interpretation. The requirement of preg-
nancy in these statutes is derived from language referring to acts
toward "a pregnant woman," a "woman pregnant with child" or
a "woman with child." The construction of these statutes poses
problems because, among other things, in the majority of jurisdic-
tions at common law the woman toward whom the acts were direc-
ted had to be pregnant, and at the stage of quickening.8 5 The
question which commonly arose in the interpretation of these
statutes was: Did the statute prohibit interference with pregnancy
only after quickening, or did the statute change the common law
permitting the offense to be committed during earlier stages of
pregnancy? In this discussion, we are concerned with an even
narrower point: Can the offense be committed in the earliest stage
of pregnancy, between conception and implantation?
Some states have criminal abortion statutes expressly referring
to acts done toward a woman with a quick child or to the killing
of a quick child. Since the pre-implantation means of fertility con-
trol terminate pregnancy before quickening, such statutes would
not make those means illegal.
There is no reported case specifically deciding whether the use
of pre-implantation means of fertility control violates abortion
statutes containing an express requirement of pregnancy, or, in
other words, whether a criminal abortion really may be committed
by interruption of pregnancy shortly after conception. However,
broad language has been used in some cases to indicate that the
statutes apply from the moment of conception.36
The legality of pre-implantation means under abortion stat-
utes containing an express requirement of pregnancy may seem
35 Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass. 387 (1812); see cases cited Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d
1393, 1396 (1956).
86 E.g., Hans v. State, 147 Neb. 67, 22 N.W.2d 385 (1946), vacated on other grounds,
147 Neb. 730, 25 N.W.2d 35 (1946); Gray v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. 221, 178 S.W. 337 (1915);
State v. Ausplund, 86 Ore. 121, 167 Pac. 1019 (1917), error dismissed, 251 U.S. 563 (1919).
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academic. Were a case involving the pre-implantation means to
arise, the problem of proof of pregnancy would be insurmountable
since all practical methods used to determine early pregnancy in
humans require for their effectiveness the physiological state pre-
sent after implantation." But the inability to prove pregnancy
would not prevent prosecutions under abortion-related statutes,
for example, those prohibiting the manufacture or sale of aborti-
facients. If the use of the pre-implantation means were a criminal
abortion, the manufacturer or seller of the pre-implanta-
tion means might be prosecuted.
(a) Statutes Referring to Destruction of the Unborn Child
Nebraska 8 and Wisconsin 39 have criminal abortion statutes
referring to the destruction of the unborn child at any stage of
pregnancy.
In Nebraska, the statute proscribes the use of means on "any
pregnant woman with a vitalized embryo, or foetus, at any stage
of utero gestation ' 40 with a provision that "in case of the death of
such vitalized embryo, or foetus, [the person who uses the means]
shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary. ' 4t In Hans v. State42 this
provision was said to apply to the destruction of the developing
being at any stage of gestation. In that case the defendant was
charged with "foeticide" under the state criminal statute43 for
killing an embryo of a woman roughly 1/ months pregnant. The
Nebraska constitution prohibited bills relating to more than one
subject. The defendant argued that the killing of an embryo and
the killing of a fetus made unlawful by the bill were two different
subjects, and thus the bill violated the constitution. The court rec-
37 The commonly used Ascheim-Zondek, Friedman, American male frog and other
endocrine pregnancy tests are ineffective until development of chorionic tissue. The
chorionic tissue is not developed until implantation, and the tests often are not positive
until about three weeks after implantation. See generally, Williams, Obstetrics 259-73
(llth ed. 1956); Gray, Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine 693-712 (2d ed. 1940).
38 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-404 (1956).
39 Wis. Stat. § 940.04 (1961).
40 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-404 (1956). The word "vitalized" in "vitalized embryo" has
been defined as meaning endowed with life, not dead. State v. Patterson, 105 Kan. 9, 181
P. 609 (1919). The court in the Hans case did not consider whether the unborn child at
I 2 months' pregnancy was "vitalized," nor did it consider the time at which vitalization
comes about.
41 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-404 (1956).
42 147 Neb. 67, 22 N.W.2d 385 (1946), vacated on other grounds, 147 Neb. 730, 25
N.W.2d 35 (1946).
43 § 28-404, R.S. 1943, identical to the statute supra note 41.
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ognized that medically a distinction is made between an embryo
and a fetus, but rejected defendant's contention on the ground that
at law no distinction was made between these terms:
The legislature used the terms ["embryo" and "foetus"] in their
ordinary and commonly accepted meaning, and when it used the
term "foeticide" it meant the unlawful destruction of an unborn
child, in ventre sa mere, in any stage of gestation.44
In this case, the developing individual was advanced to the stage
of about 1 /2 months; it was not a 9-day-old fertilized ovum. How-
ever, within the broad language used in this case, the interruption
of gestation within two weeks after conception by the pre-implanta-
tion means would constitute the destruction of a child "in any
stage of gestation" and thus a criminal abortion.
Under the Wisconsin statute45 it is unlawful to intentionally
destroy an "unborn child." The latter term is expressly defined
as "a human being from the time of conception until it is born
alive." 46 The use of pre-implantation means would probably vio-
late this statute since an "unborn child," as here defined, would
include a fertilized ovum.
(b) Statutes Referring to a "Pregnant Woman" or a "Pregnant
Female"
Seventeen states, 47 Puerto Rico, 4s and the Virgin Islands9
44 Hans v. State, supra note 42, 22 N.W.2d at 387. The term "uterogestation" used
in a prior Nebraska abortion statute has been defined as meaning any stage of pregnancy.
Edwards v. State, 75 Neb. 251, 112 N.W. 611 (1907).
45 Wis. Stat. § 940.04 (1961).
46 Wis. Stat. § 940.04(6) (1961).
47 a. Ala. Code tit. 14, § 9 (1948).
b. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-211 (1956).
c. Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1102 (1953).
d. Idaho Code Ann. § 18-601 (1948).
e. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21-437 (1949).
f. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:87 (1950),
g. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.204 (1962).
h. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-401 (1947).
i. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-405 (1956).
j. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 585:12 (1955).
k. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:87-1 (1953).
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-5-1 (1964).
m. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-45 (1953).
n. N.D. Cent. Code § 12-25-01 (1960).
o. S.D. Code § 13-3101 (Supp. 1960).
p. Tex. Pen. Code art. 1191 (1961).
q. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-1 (1953).
48 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33 § 1053 (1956), set forth in 49 Geo. L.J. 395, 509 (1961).
49 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14 § 151 (1957), set forth in 49 Geo. L.J. 516 (1961).
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have criminal abortion statutes referring to acts done with intent
to produce an interruption of pregnancy towards a "pregnant
woman" or a "pregnant female." These statutes could easily be
held to prohibit use of the pre-implantation means of fertility con-
trol.
The language referring to the intent to interrupt pregnancy
in these statutes includes reference to the intent to procure a "mis-
carriage," "abortion," "premature birth" or an "unlawful in-
terruption of pregnancy." The substantive provisions of these
statutes are substantially identical. However, the statutes of Louis-
iana, New Mexico, and Texas differ from the rest of the states in
this class by the particularity used in describing the period of preg-
nancy during which a criminal abortion can be performed, and
thus requiring separate consideration.
In New Mexico, an abortion is committed by the use of means
toward "any pregnant woman ... whereby an untimely interrup-
tion of pregnancy is produced, or attempted to be produced...."-0
"Pregnancy" is expressly defined as "that condition of a woman
from the date of conception to the birth of her child."5' Under the
express language of this statute one who administers means of pre-
implantation fertility control could be subject to prosecution for
a felony.
The Texas statute5 2 provides that:
By "abortion" is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall
be destroyed in the woman's womb or that a premature birth
thereof be caused.53
In Gray v. State5 4 this provision was said to apply to interruption
of pregnancy at any stage. In that case, the defendant was convicted
of abortion of a woman who was three to four weeks pregnant. On
appeal, the defendant attacked the sufficiency of the indictment
which charged that he used means to produce an abortion on a
woman who was "then. .. pregnant," but failed to allege destruc-
tion of the fetus or embryo in the womb under the statute. The
50 Supra note 47(1).
51 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-5-2 (1964).
52 Supra note 47(p).
53 Ibid.
54 77 Tex. Crim. 221, 178 S.W. 337 (1915).
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court held that the language of the indictment embraced the statu-
tory definition and that the terms embryo and fetus were included
in the statute simply to indicate that quickening was not required.
These terms did not limit "pregnant," which was held to include
the whole period from conception to delivery. An abortion could
be committed at any time during that period.
The decision in Gray v. State5" typifies the confusion caused
by the lack of consistency between the medical and legal definitions
of various expressions that permeate the abortion statutes. The
Gray case implies that to destroy an embryo or fetus is equivalent
to the interruption of pregnancy at any stage. But, the weight of
medical authority speaks of an initial stage of pregnancy lasting to
the time of implantation, or shortly thereafter (about one to two
weeks after conception), and known as the "ovum" stage; the "em-
bryo" stage on the other hand begins at or shortly after implanta-
tion and ends about 5 to 8 weeks after conception; and the "fetus"
stage continues thereafter.5 6 [But, clinicians and physiologists do
not even agree whether an "abortion" in the medical sense can be
committed before implantation.]17 Thus, the yet unanswered ques-
tion is whether in the legal sense the term "embryo" really includes
the term "fertilized ovum."
The Louisiana statute,58 makes unlawful the use of means on
a pregnant female "for the purpose of procuring the premature
delivery of the embryo or fetus." In Dore v. State5 9 the distinction
between "embryo" and "fetus" was recognized, but the court failed
to specify the earliest time of pregnancy at which the unborn child
could be called an "embryo." The defendant was convicted under
that Louisiana statute of attempting to procure the premature de-
livery of an "embryo." The evidence showed that the unborn child
that had been prematurely delivered was about four to five months
premature. The State's medical experts had testified that the
55 Ibid.
56 Authorities cited, Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law 147 (1957);
Arey, Developmental Anatomy 2 (6th ed. 1954); Williams, Obstetrics 182 (lth ed. 1956).
But see Blakiston, New Gould Medical Dictionary 334 (1949). Webster, Third New Inter-
national Dictionary 740 (1961), gives two definitions of "embryo." According to one defini-
tion the embryonic stage would begin at conception; according to the other it would
begin from the time of implantation.
57 Med. World News, Nov. 8, 1963, p. 54.
58 Supra note 47(f).
59 227 La. 282, 79 So. 2d 309 (1955).
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embryonic stage ends and the fetal stage begins at about the eighth
week of pregnancy. Thus, defendant argued that the unborn child
in question was actually a fetus, not an embryo. The appellate
court agreed, finding error in the introduction of evidence of the
premature delivery of a "fetus" when the conviction was for the
attempt to procure the premature delivery of an "embryo."
But the Dore case did not answer the question of what was
the earliest time during pregnancy that an unborn child could be
called an "embryo" under the statute. There is some question
whether the term "embryo" includes the developing individual
from the moment of conception, or, on the other hand, refers to
this mass of cells only after implantation." Under the latter defini-
tion the use of pre-implantation means would not be a criminal
abortion in ;Louisiana. But under the former definition, where
the product of conception is an "embryo," the use might violate
the statute. However, the definitions of these terms may be signif-
icant if the doctrine of the Texas case, Gray v. State,61 were used.
Under that doctrine, the use of the terms "embryo" and "fetus"
would not limit the definition of pregnancy to those stages alone,
but would cover the whole period from conception to delivery.
The terms would be construed to simply indicate that pregnancy
at the stage of quickening was not required. Under such an inter-
pretation, the use of the pre-implantation means of fertility control
would be unlawful.
With the exceptions of the Louisiana, New Mexico, and
Texas statutes referred to above, the substantive provisions of the
remainder of the statutes referring to acts toward a "pregnant
woman" with intent to terminate pregnancy are substantially
identical. Typical of these statutes are those of Michigan 62 and
New Jersey.63 The Michigan statute provides:
Any person who shall . . . administer to any pregnant woman any
medicine, drug, substance or thing whatever, or shall employ any
instrument or other means whatever, with intent thereby to pro-
cure a miscarriage . . . shall be guilty of .... 64
60 See note 56.
61 77 Tex. Crim. 221, 178 S.W. 337 (1915).
62 Supra note 47(g).
63 Supra note 47(k).
64 Supra note 47(g).
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The New Jersey statute provides:
Any person who, ...with intent to cause or procure the mis-
carriage of a pregnant woman, administers or prescribes or ad-
vises or directs her to take or swallow any ... drug... or uses any
instrument or means whatever, is guilty of .. .65
Cases interpreting many of these statutes have used broad
language not required by the facts of the situation to intimate that
the statutes forbid acts done at any stage of pregnancy from the
moment of conception. 66 The recent case of State v. Colmer67 typ-
ifies this use of broad language. In that case the woman was about
five weeks pregnant when the attempted abortion was performed.
Pregnancy was shown by a positive Friedman test made at about
three weeks after conception. (This positive result indicates that
implantation had occurred.) In construing the statute, the court,
following past New Jersey decisions, stated that pregnancy under
the abortion statute begins at the moment of conception and ter-
minates with delivery of the child. In light of such broad language
the use of pre-implantation means would probably be unlawful in
these jurisdictions.
(c) Statutes Referring to a "Woman Pregnant with Child" and
a "Woman with Child"
Seven states6 have abortion statutes referring to acts toward
a "woman pregnant with child." Four states69 have abortion
statutes referring to acts upon a "woman with child." In the ab-
sence of an express indication of the period of pregnancy during
which the crime can be committed, there is no consistency in the
decisions as to whether a particular period was meant.
65 Supra note 47(k).
66 See State v. Fitzgerald, 49 Iowa 260 (1878); see cases cited Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1393,
1398 (1956).
67 45 N.J. Super. 236, 132 A.2d 325 (1959).
68 a. Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 65-4-6 (1949) (manslaughter).
b. Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1101 (1953) (assault with intent to murder).
c. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 3 (1957).
d. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 134 § 9 (1954).
e. Miss. Code Ann. § 2223 (1956).
f. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 163.060 (1961) (manslaughter).
g. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-301 (1955).
69 a. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-301 (Supp. 1963).
b. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-2-23 (1953).
c. Hawaii Rev. Laws § 309-3 (1955).
d. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-82 (1962) (felony).
e. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-83 (1962) (misdemeanor).
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The Maryland Statute70 contains an express provision that
the acts made unlawful are those committed for the purpose of pro-
curing a "miscarriage or abortion of a woman pregnant with child
at any period of her pregnancy. ' ' 71 It would appear that this statute
covers a person who sells, uses, or causes the use of the pre-implan-
tation means for fertility control.
Where, contrary to the situation in Maryland, there is no ex-
press statutory provision, the cases conflict on the question of
whether the crime can be committed at any stage of pregnancy.
The Wisconsin case of Foster v. State72 explains the philosophy be-
hind the view that statutes referring to acts upon a "woman preg-
nant with child" or "a woman with child" relate only to acts done
at the stage of quickening. At the period in which the case arose,
Wisconsin had two abortion statutes. Under one of these,73 the use
of means on "any woman pregnant with child.., with intent there-
by to destroy such child.. . in the case of death of such child or of
such mother" was manslaughter. This provision was found in the
chapter relating to "Offenses Against Lives and Persons." Under
the other,74 the use of means on "any pregnant woman... with in-
tent thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman" was
a misdemeanor. This provision was found in the chapter relating
to "Offenses Against Chastity, Morality and Decency."
In the Foster case the defendant had been convicted under
the manslaughter statute for the killing of an unborn child of a
pregnant woman. The woman was six to eight weeks pregnant
when the alleged abortion was performed; she did not die as a re-
sult of the operation. Since the woman was six to eight weeks preg-
nant, the unborn child was in the embryonic state.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the con-
viction on the ground that the manslaughter statute referring to
"woman pregnant with child" meant a woman pregnant with a
quick child. Since the unborn child in this case was an embryo, not
a quick child, defendant should have been prosecuted under the
70 Supra note 68(c).
71 Ibid.
72 182 Wis. 298, 196 N.W. 233 (1923).
78 Wis. Stats. § 4352 (1923).
74 Wis. Stats. § 4583 (1923).
FERTILITY CONTROL
misdemeanor statute. The basis of the decision was that the man-
slaughter statute related to taking a human being's life, while the
misdemeanor statute did not-it was simply an offense against
morality. An embryo was held not to be a human being in the le-
gal sense. In arriving at its decision, the court said:
In a strictly scientific and physiological sense there is life in an
embryo from the time of conception, and in such sense there is also
life in the male and female elements that unite to form the em-
bryo. But law for obvious reasons cannot in its classifications fol-
low the latest or ultimate declarations of science. It must for pur-
poses of practical efficiency proceed upon more everyday and pop-
ular conceptions .... That it should be less of an offense to de-
stroy an embryo in a stage where human life in its common accept-
ance has not yet begun than to destroy a quick child is a conclusion
that commends itself to most men .... Both the quick child and
the mother are human beings-hence to unlawfully kill either
constitutes manslaughter. A two months' embryo is not a human
being in the eye of the law, and therefore its destruction constitutes
an offense against morality and not against lives and persons.75
It is interesting to note that in this decision the court distin-
guished a prior Wisconsin case.78 In the prior case, it was said that
under the manslaughter statute referring to a "woman pregnant
with child" an offense could be committed whether the woman was
quick with child or not. The prior case was distinguished on the
ground that it involved a situation where the death of the mother
resulted.
In states currently having two abortion statutes77 similar to
those of Wisconsin at the time of the Foster decision, it would be
expected that the view of Foster would prevail. The termination
of pregnancy during the embryonic stage (or earlier) would not
violate statutes providing the more severe penalties. This expecta-
tion has been borne out, where cases have arisen. 78 Since such
severe statutes would not relate to acts done in earlier stages of
75 182 Wis. at 301-2, 196 N.W. at 235.
76 State v. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299 (1877). But if the prosecution is for death of the
mother, the child need not be quick. State v. Walters, 199 Wis. 68, 225 N.W. 167 (1929).
77 The Georgia and South Carolina statutes cited, supra notes 47, 68, and 69. Ten-
nessee has two abortion statutes: Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-301, -302 (1955). The statute
providing the more severe penalties, § 39-301, refers to any "pregnant woman with child,
whether such child be quick or not .... " The reasoning of Foster might not be applicable
because of the express provision that quickening is not necessary.
78 Accord: Taylor v. State, 105 Ga. 846, 33 S.E. 190 (1898); State v. Steadman, 214 S.C.
1, 51 S.E.2d 91 (1948).
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pregnancy, the use of pre-implantation means of fertility control
should not violate them.
But the situation is more complex in states having only one
abortion statute. In such states many cases have used broad lan-
guage to the effect that the phrases "woman pregnant with child"
or "woman with child" refer to a woman at any stage of pregnancy.
This sweeping language has been used even where the offense is
manslaughter. In an Oregon case, State v. Ausplund,7 the defend-
ant appealed from a conviction for manslaughter under the state
statute which provided that any person who used means on a
woman pregnant with a child "with intent to destroy such child
S.. in case the death of such child or mother is thereby produced,
be deemed guilty of manslaughter."' 0 At the time of the alleged
abortion, the woman was about three months pregnant. Both
mother and child died as a result of the abortion. The defendant
had objected to the instruction that a woman is "pregnant with
child" from the moment of conception to the time of delivery. The
defendant had contended that "pregnant with child" meant "preg-
nant with a quick child." On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court
sustained the conviction and the instruction was held to be correct.
The view of the court was:
[W]hen a virile spermatozoon unites with a fertile ovum in the
uterus,8 ' conception is accomplished. Pregnancy at once ensues and
continues until parturition. During all this time the woman is
"pregnant with child" within the meaning of the statute ....
From the moment of conception a new life has begun and is pro-
tected by the enactment. The product of conception during its
entire course is imbued with life and capable of being destroyed
as contemplated by law.82
Although the statutes involved were substantially identical,
the language and holdings of State v. Ausplunds' and Foster v.
State 4 are conflicting. A distinction between the two can be made:
In Foster, the prosecution was for the death of the unborn "child,"
the mother was not killed. In Ausplund, the prosecution involved
79 86 Ore. 121, 167 Pac. 1019 (1917), error dismissed, 251 U.S. 563 (1919).
80 L. Ore. L. § 1900. The Oregon statute, supra, note 68(0, contains identical lan-
guage.
81 The accepted theory today is that fertilization occurs in the Fallopian tube.
82 86 Ore. at 131, 167 Pac. at 1022-3.
83 Supra note 79.
84 182 Wis. 298, 196 N.W. 233 (1923).
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the death of both the mother and unborn "child." Whether the
Oregon statute construed in Ausplund would really be held to ap-
ply to the destruction of an embryo, or even a fertilized ovum be-
fore implantation, in a case where there is no maternal death, re-
mains unknown. The language of Ausplund indicates that the
Oregon statute would be held to apply.
Thus, in states having only one abortion statute, which refers
to a "woman pregnant with child" or a "woman with child" two
problems are presented. First, does the statute apply to the term-
ination of the pregnancy before the stage of quickening? Some
statutes 5 expressly answer the question by stating that they apply
before or after quickening. Second, even if the statute expressly
states that it applies, or has been held to apply to pregnancy before
the stage of quickening, does it really prohibit interference with
pregnancy from the moment of conception? The broad language
of the decisions in accord with Ausplund say yes. 86 However, the
legality of the use of such means has never been in issue.
III. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ABORTION STATUTES REQUIRING
PREGNANCY
The abortion statutes in which pregnancy is an element of the
offense present two further problems.
The first problem is whether they apply to the use of means
on a non-pregnant woman to terminate future pregnancies. As
discussed before, the pre-implantation means may be used on a
non-pregnant woman to terminate a future pregnancy. In fact, in
practice this may be the predominant method of their use.
The abortion statutes in which pregnancy (or supposed preg-
nancy) is an element of the offense commonly speak of acts upon
a pregnant woman. The exact terms used to denote the unlawful
acts vary from statute to statute. Typical are: the administration
85 The Arkansas and Maine statutes, supra notes 68 and 69. Hawaii's statute cited,
supra note 69(c), prescribes different punishments depending on whether or not the woman
is "then quick with child."
86 Hall v. People, 119 Colo. 141, 201 P. 382 (1948); Hawaii v. Young, 37 Hawaii 150
(1945), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947).
In regard to the statutes where the killing of the unborn child constitutes man-
slaughter, see State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52 (1848). "[F]or certain civil purposes the law
regards an infant as in being from the time of conception, yet it seems no where to regard
it as in life, or to have respect to its preservation as a living being." Id. at 57.
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of a medicine, drug or other substance; the use of an instrument
or other means; providing, supplying, prescribing, giving, or ad-
vising the use of the medicine, drug or other substance, instrument
or other means. The legislatures drafting these statutes probably
never contemplated, or perhaps fully appreciated, that modern
science could develop methods that could be used on a non-preg-
nant woman to terminate future pregnancies. Illustrative of these
laws in which pregnancy, or supposed pregnancy is an element of
the offense is the Delaware statute" which provides:
Whoever, with the intent to procure the miscarriage of any preg-
nant woman, or any woman supposed by such person to be preg-
nant ... administers, advises, prescribes or causes to be taken by
her, any... drug... or uses any instrument or other means...
is guilty of a felony.
Must the act of administration, advising, prescribing . . . etc.,
within the terms of this statute be done at the time of pregnancy
or supposed pregnancy? Or is the act continuous, the administra-
tion... prescribing, etc., continuing as long as the means can pro-
duce a miscarriage? Does "her" as used in the statute mean the
woman when pregnant or merely the woman on whom the means
are used with intent to procure the miscarriage? These questions
cannot be answered with any reasonable degree of certainty until
a prosecution is commenced for use of the pre-implantation means.
The second problem concerns the proof of pregnancy under
statutes in which pregnancy is an element of the offense. Nothing
can indicate the existence of pregnancy before implantation."'
This means that under statutes in which pregnancy is a require-
ment, the State would be unable to prove an element of the crime.
But this inability to prove the crime would not prevent prosecu-
tions under abortion-related statutes which are found in numerous
states, including those where pregnancy is not an element of the
offense under the abortion statutes. The term "abortion-related
statutes" used here means those laws which prohibit the manufac-
ture, sale, or distribution of abortifacients. The manufacturer,
distributor, or druggist might be prosecuted under such statutes. 9
87 Supra note 28(a).
88 Supra note 37.
89 See e.g.: D.C. Code Ann. § 22-2001 (1961); Il1. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 23-2 (1963)
(excepts licensed physicians); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-2803 (Supp. 1963) (excepts medical teach-
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IV. THE MODEL PENAL CODE
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code has ob-
viated the problems under current state laws associated with the
use of pre-implantation means of fertility control. Section 230.3 (1)
of the Code90 provides:
"A person who purposely and unjustifiably terminates the preg-
nancy of another otherwise than by a live birth commits a felony
of the third degree or, where the pregnancy has continued beyond
the twenty-sixth week, a felony of the second degree."
Section 230.3 (7) " further provides:
"Nothing in this Section shall be deemed applicable to the pre-
scription, administration or distribution of drugs or other sub-
stances for avoiding pregnancy, whether by preventing implanta-
tion of a fertilized ovum or by any other method that operates
before, at or immediately after fertilization." (Emphasis added.)
But the problem that still could arise in the interpretation of this
Code is whether the provision of § 230.3 (7) applies to mechanical
devices which are used to prevent implantation of a fertilized
ovum. Mechanical devices for fertility control, referred to as in-
trauterine devices, are in current use.92 If the prevailing theory
that these devices can prevent implantation of the fertilized ovum
is proved, it seems questionable whether they have been included
in Section 230.3 (7) " which excepts from the model abortion law
"drugs or other substances for avoiding pregnancy" which prevent
implantation. An intrauterine device is not a "drug." Whether it
is a "substance" within this provision is not clear.
The commentary on Section 230.3 (7) 4 suggests that chemi-
cals as opposed to mechanical devices were contemplated. In the
commentary it is said:
Subsection (7) draws the line between abortion and contracep-
tion so as to prevent application of the Section to techniques for
ing, publication or practice); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:88 (1950); Md. Ann. Code Art. 27,
§ 3 (1957) (excepts medical practitioners in specified cases); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272
§ 21 (1956); Minn. Stat. § 617-20 (1963); Miss. Code Ann. § 2289 (1956); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 559.100 (1953); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.130 (1961); N.J. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2A:170-76 (1953);
N.Y. Pen. Law § 82 (1944); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 104 (1959).
90 Model Penal Code § 230.3(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
91 Model Penal Code § 230.3(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
92 See discussion, supra note 6.
93 Supra note 91.
94 Found in the Model Penal Code § 207.11(7), comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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preventing pregnancy even if these operate shortly after fertiliza-
tion. Recent research in contraception points to methods of birth
control by oral ingestion of drugs that prevent the fertilized ovum
from establishing itself on the uterine wall, a necessary pre-condi-
tion of fetal development.95 (Emphasis added.)
The suggestion that chemicals, as opposed to mechanical devices,
were contemplated is seen from the reference in that commentary
solely to drugs, but not to mechanical devices, which prevent im-
plantation.
A further suggestion that chemicals, as opposed to mechanical
devices, were contemplated in the Model Code is seen from the
way the term "substance" is used in current state abortion statutes.
The statutes of the majority of the states use the term "substance"
in their abortion laws. The statute of Arizona typifies the way in
which this term is used:
A person who provides, supplies or administers to a pregnant
woman, or procures such woman to take any medicine, drugs or
substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other means what-
ever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman
. .. shall be punished .... 91
The term "substance" is used in the same clause with "medicine"
and "drugs." Medicines and drugs used to procure a miscarriage
are by definition chemicals; they procure a miscarriage by a phar-
macological action. The term "use of instruments or other means"
is used in a separate clause, distinct from that relating to "any
medicine, drug or substance." Instruments which have been used
to procure a miscarriage are mechanical devices; they procure a
miscarriage by a mechanical, not a pharmacological action, i.e., the
detachment of the unborn child from the uterus. Chemicals, with
which the term "substance" is associated, are distinct-both in phys-
ical form and in mode of action-from instruments. An intra-
uterine device is not a chemical; if it does prevent implantation it is
probably by a physical action.9 7 Since an intrauterine device does
95 Id. at 161.
96 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-211 (1956).
97 The following physical mechanisms of action of the devices have been proposed.
a. They cause excessive contraction of the uterine muscle so that the uterus is not
receptive to implantation of the fertilized ovum.
b. They set up a chronic irritation in the uterine tissue which prevents implantation.
c. They cause excessive Fallopian tube peristalsis (motion of the Fallopian tube
walls consisting of alternate contractions and dilations that move the contents of the tube
onward) so that the ovum, even if fertilized, is too immature to implant.
FERTILITY CONTROL
not seem to come within the term "substance," the Model Penal
Code would seem to prohibit its use as an abortifacient.
The ambiguity could be resolved by the insertion of the phrase
"or other means" after the word "substances" in Subsection (7).
CONCLUSION
Research of ever increasing importance is being carried out
on pre-implantation means of fertility control-means which ter-
minate pregnancy after conception but before implantation of the
microscopic fertilized ovum in the uterus.
The question of whether the use of these pre-implantation
means would violate the abortion laws has never been decided. In
virtually every one of the states, there are abortion statutes which
could be or have been judicially construed, by the use of sweeping
statements, to apply to acts done with an intent to terminate preg-
nancy at any time, from the moment of conception. Where judicial
construction has been given, the broad statements were made at a
time when the courts did not consider, or perhaps fully appreciate,
the possibility of safely terminating pregnancy shortly after con-
ception.
Statutes referring to acts toward "a woman" or "any woman"
with intent to produce an abortion or miscarriage have been con-
strued to proscribe the use of means on any woman, whether preg-
nant or not, with intent to interrupt pregnancy at any stage. The
same construction has been applied to statutes referring to a woman
"pregnant or supposed ... to be pregnant." Likewise, statutes re-
ferring to acts toward a "pregnant" woman and a woman "preg-
nant with child" or "with child" specifically state or have been con-
strued to mean that acts done at any time during pregnancy, from
the moment of conception, may be unlawful. Some decisions say a
later stage of pregnancy is meant.
Statutes referring to the destruction of an "embryo" have
been said to apply from the moment of conception. Medically
speaking, however, the embryonic stage may not begin until after
implantation. In the absence of a statutory definition of the term,
the cases conflict as to whether an "unborn child" exists from the
moment of conception.
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The broad language of statutes and cases would suggest that
to use the pre-implantation means on a pregnant woman would be
unlawful. If these devices are used on a non-pregnant woman to
terminate future pregnancies, their legality is uncertain. Thus,
some statutes that prohibit acts upon a woman who is pregnant may
not technically cover the use of pre-implantation means on a non-
pregnant woman to terminate future pregnancies. But it is uncer-
tain whether the technical wording of the statutes would be
followed or whether the broad purpose would instead be con-
sidered.
It is impossible to prove pregnancy before implantation.
Thus, under statutes where pregnancy is an element of the of-
fense, prosecution under the abortion statutes might be futile. But
the manufacturers, distributors or sellers of the pre-implantation
means might be prosecuted under statutes prohibiting the manu-
facture, distribution or sale of abortifacients.
Even the abortion statute of the Model Penal Code is not
completely free from ambiguity. Whether mechanical devices are
included within its section excluding "drugs or other substances,"
which prevent implantation, from the abortion provisions is an
open question.
The development of effective and safe, and preferably inex-
pensive and simple to use, means of fertility control is necessary
for our society. Fertility control is necessary to increase or perhaps
even to maintain current standards of living. The development
and use of means of fertility control which terminate pregnancy
before implantation of the fertilized ovum in the uterus should
not be retarded by sweeping language-language used at a time
when termination of pregnancy before implantation was not a
practical procedure.
If termination of pregnancy before implantation is to be con-
sidered unlawful, the legislatures should explicitly so provide. If
the legislatures do choose to so provide, they must consider whether
they are using the penal laws to punish matters on which a sub-
stantial number of moral citizens may reasonably disagree.
But whatever the result of the legislatures' provisions, the de-
velopment of pre-implantation means of fertility control should
not be retarded because the applicable abortion law is uncertain.
